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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper synthesizes modern scholarship in the fields of Artificial 
Intelligence law, Ethics, Corporate Liability, and Economics to develop potential 
liability schemes that the automotive and insurance industries may impose when 
autonomous vehicles eventually come to dominate the roadways.  By addressing 
the issues of whom the autonomous vehicle’s AI protects and who bears liability 
in the event of an accident—two issues that this author believes are critical to the 
successful adoption of autonomous vehicle technology—the transition from 
human drivers to AI drivers will be less contentious.  Because of the prescient 
nature of the topic, as well as a discussion of the intersectionality of Law, 
Technology, Philosophy, and Economics, this paper will appeal to a broad 
readership, especially those interested in autonomous vehicle technology and the 
implications that their wide-spread use will have on the law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The automobile fundamentally altered the way people travel by replacing 
the horse with the engine; “autonomous vehicles” are in a position to make the 
same transformation by replacing human drivers with computer algorithms and 
sensors.  Experts and risk analysts from the private and public sectors believe the 
removal of human drivers will eliminate almost all automobileaccidents
1  However, even if all human drivers were removed from the road, there would 
still be a substantial number of automobile accidents, some of which would be 
caused by autonomous vehicles.  These accidents raise a difficult question which 
automobile manufacturers, insurance companies, programmers, and the legal 
system need to answer before autonomous vehicles dominate the road, namely 
who is ultimately responsible for such accidents.   
This note will contemplate various solutions to the problem of accidents 
caused by autonomous vehicles.  The first section of this paper will provide a 
brief survey of the current landscape of autonomous vehicles: how the industry 
and government currently categorize various computer systems which control the 
vehicle; recent accidents involving autonomous vehicles; as well as the 
government’s current position with respect to autonomous vehicles. The second 
section of this note will examine: 1. how the vehicle’s programming is designed 
to behave in the event of an accident; 2. whether it opts to protect the passengers 
of the vehicle or whether it seeks to limit amount of damage caused by the 
accident, even if it means sacrificing the health and safety of the passengers; 
3.who will ultimately be liable in the event of an accident, and; 4. whether the 
individual driver is liable for the accident or if the auto-manufacturer and its 
program designers should be responsible. These four categories will be combined 
to create four “liability schemes:” protect the individual and individually liable 
(the current system); minimize losses and producer liability (the corporation’s 
agent approach); minimize losses and individual liability (the analytic a posteriori 
approach); and protect the individual and producer liability (the fiduciary agent 
approach).2  The final section of this note will analyze each of the four liability 
																																								 																				
1 Based on an analysis of crash data between 2005 and 2007, the NHSTA calculated around 94% 
of accidents on the road today are caused by some form of human error—driving too fast for road 
conditions, inattention, or driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, to name a few.  
Excluding accidents for which the cause could not be determined, approximately 2%, the 
remaining 4% of automobile accidents were either caused by purely environmental factors or 
issues with the vehicle.  Nat. Highway Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Traffic Safety Facts: 
Crash Statistics, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115  
2 This paper will draw fairly heavily on philosophical concepts.  The perhaps esoteric reference to 
analytic a posteriori refers to what is generally considered a contradiction of its two component 
terms, analytic propositions and a posterioi propositions.   The first is a proposition who’s 
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schemes based on the ethical, legal, and financial consequences of each system 
for both the individual drivers and autonomous vehicle manufacturers. Finally, 
based on the insights gained from the analysis, this paper will make a 
recommendation on how the industry and legal system should adapt to the 
inevitable introduction of autonomous vehicles on the road from a liability 
perspective, and conclude by recommending one or two of the best liability 
systems.     
 
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN 2016: A SURVEY OF CURRENT 
TECHNOLOGY AND TRENDS  
 
The technology behind autonomous vehicles has progressed quickly over 
the past year, and numerous automobile manufacturers have incorporated some or 
all of these technological innovations into their own vehicles.3  The technological 
innovations of the past year have also allowed companies like Google and Tesla 
to begin “beta-testing” autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles on the road, 
sometimes with controversial results, including the first recorded death caused by 
an error in the vehicle’s auto-pilot system.4  In addition to technological 
innovations, autonomous vehicle producers have received some help from the US 
government in the form of new rules and regulations issued earlier in 2016, which 
should pave the way for more autonomous vehicles on the road in the near future.   
 
A. WHAT IS AN “AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE”  
 
Autonomous vehicles are currently on the road today, although not in 
ways a person may typically expect; features that many consider standard on 
many modern vehicles such as lane departure systems or adaptive headlights are 
considered by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) to make a vehicle “semi-autonomous.5”  Currently the NHTSA uses a 
six-level classification system for identifying autonomous vehicles, which it 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 					
“predicate concept is contained in its subject concept,” the second a “proposition whose 
justification… is validated by, and grounded in experience.”  As made evident later in the paper, it 
is oxymoronic—and quite frankly unjustifiable from an economic standpoint in most 
circumstances—to require the individual passengers of an autonomous vehicle or HAV to liable 
for an accident which they could not control which also carries an inherent risk that the passenger 
themselves will be injured if that means that the overall costs of the accident will be reduced by 
some, perhaps imperceptibly small, measure.   See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON 95-96 (Marcus Weigelt ed., trans., Penguin Publishing 2008) (1781), see also PIERRE 
HASSNER, Immanuel Kant, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 581, 581-85 (Leo Strauss & 
Joseph Cropsey eds., University of Chicago Press 3d ed. 1987) (1963).  
3 James M. Anderson et al, Autonomous Vehicle Technology, a Guide for Policy Makers 5,15 
4 Pete Bigelow, NTSB Issues Initial Report on Fatal Tesla Autopilot Crash,  CAR AND DRIVER, 
http://blog.caranddriver.com/ntsb-issues-report-on-fatal-tesla-autopilot-crash/ (Published July 26, 
2016) (Last Accessed Nov., 27, 2016).   
5 Anderson, supra note 3 at xiv. 
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adopted from SAE International in September of this year.6  SAE International’s 
system—ranging from Level 0, where all of the vehicle’s functions are controlled 
by the driver, up through Level 5, a fully autonomous vehicle where the vehicle 
occupant has no control over how the car navigates the roadway—will be used by 
the NHTSA until it develops its own system7.   In addition to the five levels, the 
NHTSA categorizes vehicle on whether or not the “human operator or the 
automated system is primarily responsible for monitoring the driving 
environment;” human operators are the primary operators of vehicles that fall 
between Levels 0 through 2, automated systems are the operators of the vehicles 
for Levels 3 through 5.8  Additionally, the federal government considers all 
vehicles that fall within Levels 3 through 5 as “Highly Automated Vehicles” 
(HAV).9    
Until very recently, all manufactured vehicles fell within Level 0, where 
the human operator performs “all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even when 
enhanced by warning or intervention systems.”10  At Level 1, the human driver is 
expected to control the majority of the dynamic driving task, but may be 
augmented by some aspects of an automated system, such as stability control or 
dynamic braking.11  Vehicles that have a computer system built into them, 
including many vehicles built within the last five years, would fall within this 
classification.12 At Level 2, the autonomous system is capable of controlling 
multiple tasks—steering, acceleration/deceleration, parking, etc.—using 
information it gathers from the driving environment.  However, the human driver 
is still responsible for whatever remaining dynamic tasks the system is unable to 
perform at the time.13  Vehicles that fall into this level have only recently entered 
the market.  For example, Tesla released an “Autopilot” feature in October of 
2016, which allow the vehicle’s internal systems to operate the vehicle in place of 
the driver when activated.14  As of October of 2016, the Mercedes-Benz S65 
																																								 																				
6 Nat. Highway Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., The Federal Automated Vehicle Policy 
(Sept., 2016).  Pg. 9-10 
7 Id. at 35 
8 Id, at 10 
9 Id. 
10The SAE defines the “dynamic driving task” as “the operational (steering, braking, accelerating, 
monitoring the vehicle and roadway) and tactical (responding to events, determining when to 
change lanes, turn, use signals, etc.) aspects of the driving task, but not the strategic (determining 
destinations and waypoints) aspect of the driving task.”  SAE International, Automated Driving 
(2014), https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/automated_driving.pdf.  
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Hope Reese, Autonomous Driving Levels 0 to 5: Understanding the Differences, TECH 
REPUBLIC ( Jan. 20, 2016,)  http://www.techrepublic.com/article/autonomous-driving-levels-0-to-
5-understanding-the-differences/.  
13 SAE International, supra note 11. 
14Edward Niedermeyer, The Only Thing Autopilot at Tesla is the Hype Machine, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-10-21/the-only-thing-on-
autopilot-at-tesla-is-the-hype-machine. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018  
The Modern Trolley Problem: Ethical and Economically-Sound Liability Schemes for 
Autonomous Vehicles 
________________________________________________________________________ 
4 
	
AMG, BMW 750i, Tesla Model S, and the Infiniti Q50S—among a few others—
also qualify as Level 2, semi-autonomous vehicles currently available for sale.15 
Level 3 vehicles are the most basic form of the NHSTA’s HAV 
designation.  In addition to controlling the majority of the dynamic driving task, 
the vehicle is also capable of monitoring the driving environment and adjust to 
any changes.  There is “an expectation that the human driver will respond 
appropriately to a request [from the vehicle] to intervene,” and avoid a situation 
which the computer is unable to handle.16 Currently, no auto-manufacturer offers 
a Level 3 vehicle for sale, but Google’s current driverless vehicle would classify 
as a Level 3 autonomous vehicle; the “Google Car” uses adaptive sensors to 
determine its position relative to the road and other objects around it and the 
internal computer software “chooses a safe speed and trajectory for the car.”17  
Level 4 vehicles have all the features of their Level 3 counterparts, but crucially 
do not require human intervention in emergency situations.  In the event of a 
potential accident, this means that the human driver has the option to take control 
over the vehicle, but the vehicle does not require him to do so.18  No vehicle has 
yet to reach this level, but Tesla CEO Elon Musk believes that his company will 
be able to produce vehicles at this level as early as 2018.19  Finally, at Level 5, the 
human driver is completely eliminated from all functions of the dynamic driving 
task, as the vehicle can handle all driving situations that a human driver could, 
including emergencies.20  The critical difference between Level 4 and Level 5 
vehicles is that the human passengers have no ability to control any of the cars 
dynamic driving functions because the steering wheel and pedals have been 
removed.21 
As stated earlier in this note, the classification system currently used by 
the NTHSA is subject to change when the agency finally develops their own 
independent system, however it is not unreasonable to imagine that the 
categorization scheme they eventually adopt will bear a striking resemblance to 
the current SAE International Guidelines.  This note will mostly focus on the 
																																								 																				
15 Don Sherman, Semi-Autonomous Cars Compared! Tesla Model S vs. BMW 750i, Infiniti Q50S, 
and Mercedes-Benz S65 AMG,” CAR AND DRIVER, 
HTTP://WWW.CARANDDRIVER.COM/FEATURES/SEMI-AUTONOMOUS-CARS-COMPARED-TESLA-VS-
BMW-MERCEDES-AND-INFINITI-FEATURE (Feb., 2016); see generally IntelliSafe Autonomous 
Vehicles,VOLVO,  http://www.volvocars.com/intl/about/our-innovation-
brands/intellisafe/intellisafe-autopilot (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).  
16 SAE International, supra note 11.  
17 Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE, 
HTTPS://WWW.GOOGLE.COM/SELFDRIVINGCAR/HOW/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
18 SAE International, supra note 11. 
19  Dante D’Orazio, Elon Musk Predicts a Tesla Will be Able to Drive Itself Across the Country in 
2018, The VERGE,  (Jan.10, 2016) http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/10/10746020/elon-musk-
tesla-autonomous-driving-predictions-summon. 
20 SAE International, supra note 11. 
21 Reese, supra note 12.  
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liability for autonomous vehicles that fall within the Level 4 and Level 5 range, as 
these types of vehicles have the greatest potential to upset the current legal 
system.   
 
B. “BETA TESTING” OF AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN 2016   
 
Advocates and skeptics of autonomous vehicles have received plenty of 
evidence for their positions based on beta-testing performed in 2016.  Both 
Google and Tesla have tested some form of their autonomous vehicles in the last 
year; Google through its “Google Car” and Tesla through the activation of its 
“Autopilot” software.  While industry insiders and the public have generally 
reacted positively to such developments, the testing of these new vehicles not 
been without issue.  Autonomous vehicles have been involved in a few accidents 
in 2016, including a fatal accident in May that has been attributed to a failure of 
the vehicle’s sensors to properly identify another vehicle on the road.22  
 Google has been testing some form of autonomous vehicle since 2009, 
often retrofitting existing vehicles with their technology.23  Currently, Google 
operates a fleet of 58 vehicles—“24 Lexus RX450h SUVs and 34 prototype 
vehicles”—all of which are being tested in various locations around the United 
States, including: Austin, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; Mountain View, California; 
and Kirkland, Oregon.24  As of August, 2016, Google’s vehicles have driven over 
1.9 million miles in “Autonomous Mode,” with an average of 20,000 to 25,000 
miles per week.25  Google also introduced a vehicle close to the Level 5 SAE 
classification without pedals or a steering wheel, although the vehicle has limited 
capabilities.26  There have been few reported issues with Google’s vehicles, and 
the majority of accidents that have taken place while in “Autonomous Mode” 
were caused by other drivers.27  However, in February of 2016, Google reported 
the first accident caused by its own software; the vehicle attempted to maneuver 
out of the way of an obstacle in the road, only to sideswipe a bus in the process.28  
In its monthly report, Google claimed responsibility for the accident, stating “if 
																																								 																				
22 Bigelow, supra, note 4.  
23 Google Vehicles are driven in either manual mode, where the vehicle is operated by a 
human driver or autonomous mode, where “the software is driving the vehicle and the 
test drivers are not touching the manual controls.” Id. 
24 Id, at 1 
25 Google Vehicles are driven in either manual mode, where the vehicle is operated by a human 
driver and autonomous mode, where “the software is driving the vehicle and the test drivers are 
not touching the manual controls.” Id 
26 Supra, note 11  
27 SEA International, supra note 11, at 17.  
28 Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused its First Crash, WIRED  (FEB. 29, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving -car-may-cause-first-crash/. 
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[the Google vehicle] hadn’t moved there wouldn’t have been a collision.”29  Since 
Google reported the accident in February, there have been no other accidents 
attributed to Google’s vehicles operating in “Autonomous Mode.”30 
In October of 2015, Tesla enabled the “Autopilot” feature on some of its 
vehicles, allowing owners to test out autonomous mode in real-life situations.31  
Tesla sent out the update to all Model S and Model X vehicles sold since 2014.32  
Autopilot includes features like “Autosteer, Auto Lane Change, Autopark and 
Summon,” which moves the vehicles from the NHTSA’s Level 1 classification 
into Level 2.3334  The program has initially tested well in the United States, select 
Asian markets, and the European Union, including a few reports of the Autopilot 
feature preventing accidents.35  However, the Autopilot system has been heavily 
criticized for its role in multiple accidents since its introduction, including a fatal 
crash in Central Florida.36 According to an investigation by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Tesla’s Autopilot system was engaged, but 
failed to notice the white tractor trailer of the vehicle beside it against the bright 
sky.37  The Autopilot failed to stop or notify the Tesla driver when the other 
vehicle turned in front of his vehicle, resulting in his death.38  In the case of less 
serious accidents, the Autopilot system was engaged by the drivers, but according 
to Tesla’s internal investigations of the accidents, the drivers ignored multiple 
warnings for the driver to take control.39  Owners of these vehicles dispute Tesla’s 
																																								 																				
29 Id. 
30 Google, supra note 24, at 4.  
31 Neidermeyer, supra note 15. 
32 Id. 
33 Tesla describes the features of the Autopilot software as follows: “Autosteer and Traffic-Aware 
Cruise Control – Autosteer assists the driver on the road by steering within a lane. It relies on 
Traffic-Aware Cruise Control to maintain the car’s speed in relation to surrounding traffic. Auto 
Lane Change – By engaging the turn signal when Autosteer is engaged, drivers can be assisted in 
transitioning to an adjacent lane on the right or left side of the car, when it is safe to do so. 
Autopark – When driving at low speeds on urban streets, a “P” will appear on the Instrument 
Panel when a Tesla detects a parking spot. The Autopark guide will appear on the touchscreen 
along with the rear camera display, and, once activated, Autopark will begin to maneuver the 
vehicle into the parking space by controlling vehicle speed, gear changes and steering.  Summon – 
With Summon, you can move Model S in and out of a parking space from outside the vehicle 
using the mobile app or the key.  “Tesla Press Information,” from Tesla. 
https://www.tesla.com/presskit/autopilot#autopilot (Last Accessed Nov. 27, 2016).  
34 Id. 
35 See generally Yoni Heisler, “Model X Driver Details how Tesla’s Autopilot Software Prevented 
a Huge Accident,” BGR (OCT. 19, 2016), http://bgr.com/2016/10/19/tesla-autopilot-model-x-
crash-accident-prevention/  
36 Id. 
37 Bigelow, supra note 4.  
38 Id.  
39 Fred Lambert, “Tesla Autopilot Crash in Montana: Drivers Reveals new Details and Claims a 
‘cover up’ by Tesla,” ELECTREK (Jul. 22, 2016),  https://electrek.co/2016/07/22/tesla-autopilot-
model-x-crash-montana-coverup/  
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claim that they are solely at fault.40  According to the driver involved in one 
accident while Autopilot was activated, the vehicle “suddenly veered right and 
crashed into the safety barrier post…[without] any warning beep.41 Autopilot did 
not slow down at all after the crash, but kept going in the original speed setting 
and continued to crash into more barrier posts in high speed.”42  These accidents 
and Tesla’s response to them have left some skeptical about the company’s ability 
to release a fully autonomous vehicle in the near future.43 
  Google’s and Tesla’s beta-testing programs over the past year have 
revealed a lot about the current state of autonomous vehicle technology, and 
provided both companies information to better upgrade their systems.  Tesla, for 
example, is using the data it has collected over the past year through its Autopilot 
program to make upgrades for an Autopilot 2.0 update, which was released in 
October of 2016.44  Additionally, the few accidents caused by the vehicle’s 
software have highlighted certain issues with legal liability in the case of 
accidents; Tesla has recently indicated that they will not accept liability for 
accidents involving the new Autopilot 2.0 unless it can be proven that software 
solely caused the accident and the human driver attempted to take control of the 
vehicle.45 
 
C. NEW GOVERNMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS 
REGARDING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 
Earlier in 2016, the NHTSA announced new rules updating their position 
on autonomous vehicles.  As mentioned earlier in this note, one of the major 
changes to the NHTSA’s rules is the adoption of the SAE International 
classifications of autonomous vehicle capabilities.  In addition, the NHTSA policy 
reveals that the government is simultaneously looking to increase the safety and 
security of vehicles while providing a great deal of deference to the individual 
states and the autonomous vehicle producers to develop comprehensive safety and 
liability policies.46 
The NHTSA’s new rules indicate that the government views autonomous 
vehicles as an inevitability, and welcomes the advancement as a way to improve 
road safety, increase access to transportation, and reduce the environmental 
																																								 																				
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Neidermeyer, supra note 15. 
44 Tesla, supra, note 33. 
45 Yoni Heisler, “Elon Musk: Tesla Will Only Pay for Autopilot Accidents if the Software makes 
a Mistake,” BGR (Oct. 20, 2016) http://bgr.com/2016/10/20/tesla-autopilot-crashes-liability-elon-
musk/  
46 Supra, note 6, 25-26. 
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impact of vehicle use in the United States.47  The NHTSA believes that the 
introduction of autonomous vehicles will significantly reduce the number of 
accidents on the road, as a majority of accidents are caused by human drivers.48  
By replacing the human element with a machine, many of the mistakes in 
judgement associated with human behavior will be eliminated.49   Accident 
avoidance features, the NHTSA believes, will be critical in improving road safety 
and saving lives.50  Furthermore, vehicle artificial intelligence (AI) is capable of 
learning after one mistake and applying what it learned to all other autonomous 
vehicles with the same AI.  While human drivers will make the same mistake in 
response to a situation, once any autonomous vehicle makes a mistake, it can send 
that information back to the manufacturer and an update can be created to prevent 
all other vehicles from making a similar mistake.51 
The introduction of autonomous vehicles onto the roadway should 
theoretically increase access to transportation for groups who may be 
disadvantaged under the current system.  Traditionally, access to an automobile 
meant that the person usually owned the vehicle.52  However, the rise of the 
sharing economy with companies like Uber and Lyft, as well as “car sharing 
clubs”—groups where members are able to rent vehicles for short periods of time 
and pay based on their use—have greatly reduced the demand for owning 
automobiles.  These changes primarily benefit young professionals who live in 
urban environments, but still critically leaves out those who do not have the 
means to obtain a driver’s license or pay for these options.  Full implementation 
of autonomous vehicles would allow those traditionally unable to drive the 
mobility offered by owning a vehicle.53  The NHTSA believes that the 
introduction of autonomous vehicles, combined with the lower ownership rates 
associated with the sharing economy, means fewer vehicles will be transporting 
more people.54 
The NHTSA also contemplates various environmental benefits from the 
implementation of fully autonomous vehicles, as fewer automobiles with a higher 
utilization rate could result in a more efficient allocation of limited environmental 
resources.  The AI of an automated vehicle may be designed to make more fuel 
efficient choices, either by driving at the most fuel efficient speed or 
																																								 																				
47 Kelsey D. Atherton, “What you Need to Know About the new Federal Rules for Driverless 
Cars,” POPULAR SCIENCE (Sept. 21, 2016),  http://www.popsci.com/read-federal-rules-for-
driverless-cars#page-2  
48 Supra, note 1; see also Supra, note 6, pg. 5.   
49 Id.  at 27-30. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 17-20. 
52 “The Driverless, Car Sharing Road Ahead, THE ECONOMIST. 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21685459-carmakers-increasingly-fret-their-industry-
brink-huge-disruption  
53 Supra note 6 at 4. 
54 Id. 
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implementing other fuel saving techniques.55 Furthermore, the NHTSA believes 
that if those vehicles run on electricity, the environmental benefits of the switch to 
autonomous vehicles would be compounded.56  For example, if automated 
vehicles were to switch from gasoline to electrical power, some sources estimate 
that carbon-dioxide emissions from personal vehicles could drop by as much as 
94%.57  In addition, infrastructure needs may be significantly reduced, caused by 
less “wear and tear” and the increased carrying capacity of existing roadways, as a 
result of better utilization of and more efficient driving on the roadways.58 
The NHTSA’s new statement also indicates that the federal government is 
expecting the individual States, insurance companies, and auto-manufacturers to 
work out how autonomous vehicles will be introduced onto the road through its 
Model State Policy.59  Perhaps of greatest interest to this note is the NHTSA’s 
suggestion that the individual States figure out a liability scheme for autonomous 
vehicles generally, and HAVs specifically, prior to full introduction.60  The States 
must determine important liability questions, including: who must carry insurance 
for the vehicles—whether it be the driver of the vehicle, the auto-manufacturer, 
the owner of the vehicle, etc.— or which party will be determined to be at fault in 
the event of a HAV crash, to name a few.61  In addition to creating a liability 
system, the NHTSA advises that States consider the economic and legal impact of 
imposing one liability scheme over another, as introducing a system that does not 
adequately consider the costs or imposes a confusing regulations will create 
undue hardship on the implementation of autonomous vehicles.62  Numerous State 
governments have taken the initiative in crafting legislation or issuing executive 
orders regarding autonomous vehicles, including California, Arizona, and 
Washington.63 
 Interestingly enough, the NHTSA also posits ethical considerations for 
autonomous vehicles, and asks those involved with their design, implementation, 
and regulation to consider these issues as well.  Such moral and ethical 
considerations are obviously important, as this is an instance of technology, the 
law, and human life intersecting in a way that will become all too common in the 
near future.  By addressing such issues now, before full scale implantation of 
																																								 																				
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Camille von Kaenel, “Driverless Cars may Slow Pollution,” SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 19, 
2016) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/driverless-cars-may-slow-pollution/  
58 Supra note 6 at 4.  
59 Id. at 39-45.   
60 Id. at 44-45 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 For a full list of states which have either passed, considered, or failed to pass legislation or 
executive action on autonomous vehicles, see the map provided by Stanford Law. [Exhibit A] 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_
Action  
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technology occurs, systems will be in place to allow for a smooth transition from 
human agents to non-human ones. 
 
III. THE FOUR CATEGORIES FOR UNDERLYING LIABILITY FOR 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 
Before considering possible liability schemes for autonomous vehicles 
themselves, it will be useful to explore their constituent parts.  First, it is 
necessary to determine to whom a duty of care is owed: the individual or society 
at large.  Autonomous vehicles are at a unique intersection in Tort law because 
they are both a product sold to individual consumers, who is owed several duties 
of care to ensure that the product they are sold does not intentionally injured 
them, and the individual driver, who owes a duty of care to others in the safe 
operation of their vehicles.  Equally important is determining the party who is 
liable to others: either the individual owner/operator of the HAV, or the HAV’s 
manufacturer.  In this instance, engaging with a HAV AI blurs the line between an 
agent, who performs the dynamic driving task on behalf of the occupants but is 
created by the auto-manufacturer, and an inherently dangerous activity, where the 
individual must ultimately bear the responsibility for the actions of their HAV’s 
AI.  By exploring each of the individual facets, this note seeks to better inform its 
readers as to the costs and benefits of each position.   
 
A. THE INDIVIDUAL OR SOCIETY: TO WHOM IS THE HAV’S 
DUTY OWED? 
 
The problem posed by HAV’s duty to protect is not a novel one, in fact it 
is nearly identical to the “Trolley Problem.”64  The HAV’s AI, similar to the 
observer in the trolley problem, faces a decision, to save the lives of its passengers 
at the expense of others or to sacrifice the lives of its passengers in order to 
																																								 																				
64The Trolley Problem describes a philosophical thought experiment often used in introductory 
philosophy classes to demonstrate two major modern philosophies: Utilitarianism and Deontology 
or Duty-based morality.  The problem has many iterations, but is typically described as follows: a 
trolley is hurtling down a track towards five people. You are on a bridge under which it will pass, 
and you can stop it by putting something very heavy in front of it. As it happens, there is a very fat 
man next to you – your only way to stop the trolley is to push him over the bridge and onto the 
track, killing him to save five. Should you proceed? The two options demonstrate one of the 
philosophical positions; should one choose to sacrifice the fat man, they have taken the Utilitarian 
position by saving the five people on the track, netting four lives by their actions, while allowing 
the trolley to continue on its course without interference is the Deontological position, in which 
one respects the duty they owe to the fat man as a fellow human being and do not sacrifice his life 
in order to save the lives of the other people on the track.  THOMAS CATHCART, THE 
TROLLEY PROBLEM OR WOULD YOU THROW THE FAT GUY OFF THE BRIDGE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUM, 1-2 (Workman Publishing, 2013); See also Nick Belay, 
Robot Ethics and Self-Driving Cars: How Ethical Determinations in Software Will Require A 
New Legal Framework, 40 J. Legal Prof. 119, (2015). 
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maximize the utility of its actions.  In order to determine a satisfactory answer to 
the problem, both positions contemplated by the problem—protecting the 
individual by respecting the duty of care owed to them or to minimizing the costs 
by sacrificing the life of an individual—should be examined to determine not only 
the economic and social costs that implementing such a policy may have, but also 
the potential human costs of adopting one position over the other.   
 
i. THE HAV’S DUTY SHOULD BE TO PROTECT 
SOCIETY’S INTEREST BY MINIMIZING COSTS 
 
By designing all HAVs to protect society’s interest over the individual, 
and therefore minimize the overall costs of the accident, the law would be taking 
the most Utilitarian approach to the question.65  HAVs would need to make 
calculations of the risk, reward, and cost of every potential act it could take in a 
given situation, and based on those calculations, execute a decision or series of 
decisions which would maximize “utility.”  Practically speaking, this would make 
the HAV’s internal computer systems, and by extension the auto-manufacturer or 
programmer, the “least cost avoider”.66  In Level 5 HAVs, which lack any input 
systems for the passengers of the vehicle to control or override the decisions of 
the internal computer systems, the only party who would be capable of avoiding 
the accident would be the vehicle’s internal systems.  
For the designers and manufacturers of HAVs, such an arrangement 
makes economic sense; it would be far better for the HAV to limit the amount of 
damage it causes in an accident than it would be for it to take unnecessary and 
economically costly decisions in an attempt to save the lives of the passengers 
inside the vehicle.  The vehicle’s AI would be driving the vehicle, and like any 
other driver on the road, it owes duties of care to pedestrians, vehicles, and other 
property owners on or adjacent to the roadway.  However, unlike human beings, 
the vehicle’s AI does not have an irrational survival instinct, thus making it more 
accurate in balancing the probability of its passengers surviving the accident and 
																																								 																				
65Utilitarianism as a moral philosophy argues that the moral worth of an act should be judged on 
the outcome of the act.  Acts which result in the greatest amount of happiness—referred to as 
utility—for the greatest number of people possible are considered to be more morally good than 
acts which create less happiness for fewer people.  Happiness in this context is best understood as 
well-being.  In proscribing a course of action for those who follow this philosophy, agents should 
act in a way which they believe the outcome of their acts will create the greatest utility or limit the 
overall amount of suffering to a minimum. See J.J.C SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
UTILITARIANISM FOR & AGAINST, at 30-36 (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
66 In Tort law, the least cost avoider is the party which could most easily and most cheaply 
avoided the accident involving the parties.  For example, if two vehicles were involved in a 
collision, then the least cost avoider would be the party which could have most easily or cheaply 
prevented the accident, by say, swerving or changing speed.  Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Nuno 
Garoupa, Least Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety, Geo. Mason U. J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 3, (2007).   
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the cost of executing maneuvers in order to ensure that its passengers survive.  
For example, if the vehicle’s AI determines that taking extreme maneuvers in 
order to protect its passengers in the event of an accident would result in greater 
damage to property or human life than if it took less extreme measures that put its 
passengers at risk of harm, then the AI would opt for those less extreme 
measures.67  Similarly, the vehicle’s AI would most likely refuse to break the law 
in instances where breaking the law, such as a husband rushing his wife and soon-
to-be-born child to the hospital, as the utility of breaking the law would be lower 
than breaking it.68,69  This type of moral programming into the HAV’s AI could 
also find a useful application when the vehicle has no human passengers—such as 
when the vehicle is in Tesla’s “Summon” mode—or when the vehicle only 
contains cargo, such as long-distance trucking of goods across the country.70 
However, this approach is not without its drawbacks, both philosophical 
and economical.  To name a few examples without going too deeply into their 
philosophical underpinnings: how does the AI choose between two equally costly 
alternatives; how does the AI determine the value of human life, multiple human 
lives, or other objects which have no monetary values such as art, historic 
monuments, etc.; what unit does the AI use to measure the value of the objects in 
its environment?  While such concerns may seem esoteric, the value judgements 
made by HAV programmers concern real human lives.  Furthermore, these 
philosophical issues give rise to economic ones, especially if philosophical 
judgements made by AI designers conflict with the moral values held by their 
customers.  Potential customers may desire that the vehicle operate under a moral 
system which protects them over pedestrians and others, or one that calculates the 
costs of the accident in a different manner, thus limiting the sales of the 
technology to those who do not have moral objections to the decision-making 
protocols of the AI.71     
Treating the HAV’s AI as “the rational driver,” would benefit society as a 
whole through a more effective allocation of resources.  Presuming that some 
																																								 																				
67Nick Belay, Robot Ethics and Self-Driving Cars: How Ethical Determinations in Software Will 
Require A New Legal Framework, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 119 (2015). 
68Such a scenario provides a classic example of the difference between rule based utilitarian ethics 
and hedonistic utilitarianism.  While a rule-based utilitarian, such as philosopher J.S. Mill, would 
argue that more utility is created by following the law—as society as a whole benefits from its 
individual members following the law—a hedonistic utilitarian, like philosopher Jeremy Bentham, 
would argue that more utility would be created by breaking the law and allowing the father to 
more quickly to deliver his wife to the emergency room, as the pain of the act, that is the cost of 
breaking the law, is relatively small compared to the pleasure gained from the same act, that is the 
peace of mind of safely delivering the wife to the hospital.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1907); See also, LEO STRAUSS & JOSEPH CROPSEY, HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, at 710-729 (3rd ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987). 
69 Id. 
70 Tesla, supra, note 34;  
71 Supra, note 64.   
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accidents will still occur despite the introduction of HAVs, many would argue 
that it would be best that those accidents do the least amount of damage to the 
fewest number of people possible.  As such, having the HAV AI function as a 
means of reducing costs may be seen as a benefit to society, considering that 
human drivers will make irrational choices that may make accidents more 
expensive than they have to be.   
 
ii. THE HAV’S DUTY SHOULD BE TOWARDS ITS 
PASSENGERS 
 
In the context of the “Trolley Problem,” this would be akin to not pushing 
the fat man over the bridge in order to stop the trolley from killing the five people 
down the track, taking the Deontological approach to solving the issue.72  The 
observer in that situation has a duty to not act against his fellow human beings 
that trivialize or commoditize his existence; by throwing the fat man over the 
bridge to stop the trolley, the observer treats the man as a means to an end rather 
than an end-in-itself.73  In a sense, the life of the fat man is in the hands of the 
observer, as his actions control whether he lives or dies.  Similarly, the HAV, has 
total control over its passenger’s lives, as it directs them through traffic. 
Additionally, the HAV could arguably have a duty, through its manufacturers as a 
product sold to and used by its owners, to protect those its passengers from undue 
harm.   
In practice, this would mean that the HAV’s AI would take every measure 
available to it in order to save the lives of its passengers, even if such measures 
would cause more damage than the economic value of its passengers’ lives.  The 
design would both model human’s natural decision-making preference for self-
preservation, and would act as a human driver would—or would attempt to act if 
it were within their power—in the event of an accident.  Belay gives an 
interesting example in his article of a rather difficult choice a HAV may need to 
make; “imagine a scenario where a child runs in front of a car approaching a 
tunnel. The options are to either hit and kill the child or swerve into the wall and 
																																								 																				
72 Deontology, or duty-based ethics, argues that actions have moral worth based on the whether or 
not the act itself conforms to the ideals of duty that the agent owes to others.  Acts which conform 
to these duties are considered morally good, even if the outcome does not meet or result in an 
optimal outcome, while acts which do not conform with duty are seen as immoral, even if the 
outcome would result in a net positive for all those affected by the act.  In following this system of 
ethics, therefore, agents should always conform to the duties they owe others, regardless of what 
the outcome may be.  See generally, Pierre Hassner, “Immanuel Kant,” from History of Political 
Philosophy, 3rd Edition. Ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, (University of Chicago Press), pg. 
581-85. 
73 In The Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant argues that humans, as moral agents, owe 
many moral duties towards one another, including treating others “as though they were an ends to 
themselves,” or rather than human life is intrinsically valuable.  Supra, note 2 at 95-96. 
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kill the driver.”74  In this instance, because the HAV’s duty is towards its 
passengers, the HAV’s AI would make choice to hit the child in order to protect 
the life of the driver.  While such a choice may seem difficult or even cruel, such 
a decision is the preference of the majority of drivers currently on the road today; 
a survey conducted in 2012 indicated that a majority of drivers, 64%, would 
prefer that their vehicle protect themselves or their loved ones in the event of an 
accident over the lives of pedestrians or those outside the vehicle.75    
Purchasers of HAVs would obviously prefer auto-manufacturers and 
programmers to design their vehicles in this way.  Not only does this mimic the 
way that the purchasers themselves would probably react in a similar situation, 
but it could serve as a way to ease the apprehension of those skeptical of an 
autonomous vehicle’s ability to keep its passengers safe.  Because most 
passengers would believe that the vehicle they are inside is designed to keep them 
safe in an accident, programming the HAV’s AI with a duty to protect the lives of 
its passengers above all others could prevent product liability claims.76  However, 
this method is not without its drawbacks.  First, programming the vehicle’s AI to 
make potentially irrational decisions prevents autonomous vehicles as a whole 
from providing their full economic benefit to society.  If the vehicle would behave 
like a human driver would in the event of an accident, then many of the cost 
saving benefits to society might be offset in an attempt to protect the lives of 
human passengers in situations where doing so—from a cost/benefit 
perspective—would be unwise.  Additionally, programmers, auto-manufacturers, 
and insurers may be hesitant to implement systems which increase their costs in 
providing and protecting HAV users.  Assuming that HAV producers will face 
liability in the event of accidents caused by their AI, they will have to pay out the 
damages that would have otherwise been borne by insurance providers. 
 
B. THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE PRODUCER: WHO ULTIMATELY 
BEARS LIABILITY 
 
																																								 																				
74 Supra, note 64 
75 Id. 
76 Products Liability claims fall into one of three categories: manufacturing defect, where the 
product does not conform with its original, intended design; a failure by the manufacturer to 
provide adequate warning “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings,” thereby 
rendering the product unsafe; and design defect, where the “foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design,” 
and the failure to do so renders the product unsafe.  Lindor and Marchant argue that the first two 
categories of products liability claim have little to do with the design of autonomous vehicles, but 
the third—design defect—does, as an alternative design to the HAV’s AI could be argued to have 
likely prevented an accident in the future.  Gary E. Marchant and Rachel A. Lindor, “ The Coming 
Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System,” from 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1321 (2012); See Also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 (1998).   
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Another key question to answer prior to the full implementation of HAVs 
is to determine which party will bear liability in the event of an accident.  Over 
the last couple years, two distinct camps have emerged within the research: 
individual liability for the HAVs decisions under a strict liability theory, and 
producer liability under an agency theory of liability.77   
 
i. HOLDING THE INDIVIDUAL LIABLE UNDER STRICT 
LIABILITY 
 
Holding the individual liable, or requiring the individual to purchase 
insurance in order to protect society in general from any damage he makes while 
driving, is currently how liability in the United States functions.  However, this is 
ultimately a result of the individual maintaining control of the vehicle through the 
majority of the dynamic driving task.  Since HAVs will control essentially all of 
the driving task, and Level 4 and 5 vehicles ultimately do not require its 
passengers to control any part of driving, imposing such liability is not without its 
potential difficulties.  Currently, US law requires that all operators of vehicles 
have sufficient insurance to cover damages from accidents they may be involved 
in.78  Justifications for such laws vary, but two primary rationales appear to 
dominate modern thinking; either that human drivers, under a theory of 
negligence, will more likely than not make a mistake, or that the act of driving in-
and-of-itself is a dangerous activity, and therefore a driver must be strictly liable 
for any accident they cause.   
Typically, there are two different methods for holding a person liable for 
damages caused by their accidents, a negligence system and a strict liability 
system.79  Both of these systems provide economic disincentives for causing 
accidents, although the means by which those effects are carried out differ by 
																																								 																				
77 Over the years, the idea of taking a products liability approach to autonomous vehicles has 
dropped out of favor due to problems associated with how the current legal system deals with the 
issue and the fact that such an approach may not be the most beneficial way of categorizing AI, 
especially as it becomes more and more complex.  Generally speaking, products liability falls into 
three categories—as detailed in the previous footnote.  Since none of these categorizations neatly 
details how a consumer may be protected in the event of an accident, there is already an issue in 
applying a products liability framework to autonomous vehicles.  Compounding this issue are 
problems associated with products liability law generally, such as high litigation costs for widely 
sold products, marginal gains in safety improvements, and limited benefits for consumers.  This 
author is convinced by the scholarship on both products liability generally and its specific 
application to AI in the future, that the products liability framework will not be used to assess 
damages in cases involving AI.  Supra, note 64; See Generally A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven 
Shavell, “The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,” 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437.   
78 See Generally, Robert E. Helm, “Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance: A Brief History,” 1 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (Jul. 1968). 
79 See Schafer, Hans-Bernd and Muller-Langer, Frank, “Strict Liability versus Negligence,” 
GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN L. AND ECON. (2008).  
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system.80 Under a negligence system, liability is determined by the behavior of the 
agent causing the accident compared to that of a “reasonably careful person” in a 
similar situation.81  For example, if the agent acted at or above the level of care 
that a “reasonably careful person” would have, liability may be avoided; 
conversely, if the agent’s actions are determined to be below the level of care that 
would have otherwise been exercised, they are likely to be found liable.82  The 
system, in theory, creates a socially optimal level of risk-taking and avoidance, 
whereby agents are not overburdened by taking exorbitantly costly risks and 
society is protected from agents who do not undertake enough precautions.   
A strict liability scheme, on the other-hand, attempts to achieve the 
optimal level of societal risk by pinning all of the accident costs on the person 
who engages in the activity which causes the accident and making them determine 
the cost of such accidents.  Through strict liability, according to Schafer and 
Muller-Langer, “the self-interested injurer’s objective [is] to minimize her private 
costs…the injurer will have an interest to minimize total accident costs” because 
they bear full liability.83  Here, optimal risk allocation occurs when the agent takes 
just enough precautions to cover the risk of loss in an accident.  For example, a 
driver believing that their accidents will cost them $10,000 will take risk-
preventing measures up to that value.  Many legal scholars argue that this system 
provides better protection for both the injurer and the victim.  Steve Schavell 
argues that while the frequency of claims is higher under strict liability than under 
a negligence system, fewer of those cases would enter litigation, thereby reducing 
the overall societal cost of injuries by eliminating adjudication costs.84  
Additionally, those in the position to cause accidents are better at determining the 
risks and costs associated with those accidents.85  eaving optimization of risk up to 
the risk creators, thereby protecting potential victims and limiting costs for 
creators, are advantages that would benefit both victims and society.     
Almost immediately, one can see the issue of holding drivers individually 
liable for the actions of autonomous vehicles that they do not directly control.  
																																								 																				
80 Id. at 4-5. 
81 Id. 
82 The explanation provided is a simplification of a relatively complex and nuanced concept in the 
law, especially considering that the “reasonably careful person,” is a legal fiction used by courts to 
determine whether or not an agent’s actions fall under a societally optimal level of risk-taking. The 
“formula” for determining negligence and liability was first described by Judge Learned Hand in 
United States v. Carroll Towing Company as B > PL, where B is the burden of reasonable 
precaution to prevent an accident, P is the probability of that accident occurring, and L is the 
damage resulting from that accident.  If the B taken by the agent is greater than the likelihood and 
cost of the accident, then the agent will likely not be held liable for the action, and vice-versa.  
Supra, note 75 at 4; See Generally United States v. Carroll Towing Company, 159 F.2d 169 (2d. 
Cir. 1947).     
83 Supra, note 75 at .6-8.  
84 Shavell, Steven, Strict Liability versus Negligence,  9 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES (1980). 
85Supra, note 75 at 7.    
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Especially under a negligence scheme of liability, where human actors can negate 
liability by taking necessary precautions, holding individuals liable for the actions 
of their autonomous vehicles that they cannot mitigate or control is absurd.  
However, at least initially, a system of individual liability through strict liability 
might be a more palatable alternative. In a situation where the vehicle’s AI 
determines that it could not handle the situation, drivers could be held strictly 
liable for the actions that their vehicle takes while in autonomous mode because 
they knowingly accept the risk of potential accidents since the driver has the 
ability to toggle autonomous mode on and off and take control of the vehicle.  In 
doing so, early adopters of autonomous vehicle technology engage in the same 
type of decision-making rationale that Schafer and Muller-Langer discuss--the 
driver balances the personal costs of the accident with the societal costs of the 
accident.86   
During the early stages of HAV introduction onto the roadway while there 
are still human drivers on the road, individual liability through strict-liability may 
appear to be an attractive first step to comfort human motorists. The liability 
would remind early-adopters that this technology is in its early stages and in need 
of human decision-making faculties in certain situations.  In the NHTSA and 
Tesla’s own analysis of the June 2016 crash, the driver was believed to have been 
inattentive—watching a movie on his iPad while the vehicle traveled down the 
highway—which prevented him from reacting when the vehicle’s Autopilot 
systems informed him that it needed him to take over to prevent a crash.87  It is 
likely that similar accidents, where the AI needs the human driver to take over for 
it, will occur as the technology is introduced and improved upon.  Requiring 
individual liability insurance would, therefore, encourage individual responsibility 
in determining when it would be prudent to turn on autonomous mode and the 
safe operation of the vehicle  during that time, especially in difficult driving 
situations, e.g. inclement weather.  Additionally, such a move would eliminate 
any legal ambiguity regarding liability of the accident, and would allow victims a 
more direct cause of action against the owners or operators of HAVs.88   
However, some experts believe that individual liability creates numerous 
problems for the implementation of HAVs in the future.  First, the concept of 
strict liability for the act of driving would disincentivize many drivers from 
purchasing HAVs in the first place.  These experts argue that requiring 
individuals to maintain liability insurance for their HAVs in case of an accident 
would defeat the government’s objective of reducing accidents by keeping human 
drivers on the road.  Additionally, individual liability “would (at least in part) 
remove incentives for the manufacturer to program smart decisions, as the 
manufacturer would share none of the risk associated with those decisions;” in 
other words, auto-manufacturers may choose to make economic choices which 
																																								 																				
86 Id. 
87 Supra, note 4. 
88 Supra note 75 at 7-8. 
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result in less optimally designed HAV AI because they would not bear the costs 
of any mistakes or accidents caused by the vehicle.89  As a result, individual 
liability in the long-run may prove to be unappealing, especially if Level 5 
vehicles become the norm and provide the owner/operator an opportunity to use 
their own driving ability to prevent or lessen the damages of an accident. 
Ultimately, the issues associated with individual liability will become 
problematic from both an ethical and legal perspective when fully-autonomous 
vehicles come to replace human and semi-autonomous vehicles in the near future.  
The level of human agency associated with the dynamic driving task will 
inevitably be limited to entering coordinates or addresses for the HAV’s AI to 
follow, placing the responsibility for all major driving decisions with AI.  Since 
any semblance of human agency over the driving behavior of the vehicle will 
disappear, individual liability must inevitably disappear when vehicles become 
fully automated.   
 
ii. HOLDING THE PRODUCER LIABLE UNDER AN 
AGENCY APPROACH 
 
Traditionally, the concept of agency law applies to human agents who are 
employed by a principal to provide services to a third-party client.  As the AI 
enters more and more into daily life, the ability to hold an object’s AI liable under 
a theory of pure product liability has potentially become more and more difficult.  
The concept of applying agency law to AI is a relatively new legal theory, but one 
that has garnered much interest and research over the past few years, especially in 
regards to autonomous vehicles and other “smart” devices.90  The main problem 
with this approach, as many of its proponents note, is the idea that the object to 
which our legal system wishes to apply agency law to is not an agent in the 
traditional sense.91 
In order to implement a system of liability where the auto-manufacturer is 
liable to the passengers and owners of the vehicle in the event of an accident 
caused by the HAV’s AI, the issue of the HAV’s AI authority to enter into 
contracts must first be resolved.  Traditionally under agency law, the principal of 
an agent can be held liable for the acts of that agent.  However, a party injured by 
an agent may only sue the principal if that agent had either the actual or apparent 
authority to enter into that contract.92  This can be problematic given that AI is not 
typically considered a legal person capable of forming a contract.  A solution to 
this authority problem, at least partially, exists by considering that the HAV’s AI 
has the apparent authority to enter into contracts with the owner of the individual 
																																								 																				
89 Supra, note 64.   
90 See generally, Samir Chopra and Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the Contracting 
Problem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y (2009).   
91 Id. at 365. 
92 Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7.03 (2006). 
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vehicle.  This system would both “[dispense] with the need for a manifestation of 
assent by the principal to the agent…[and] avoids any need to invoke the agent's 
consent to such a manifestation.”93  However, as Samir Chopra and Laurence 
White argue in their article, such a solution may be insufficient and it may be 
prudent to give the HAV AI the actual authority to enter into contracts. 94  The 
final, and perhaps thorniest, issue presented by the implementation of agency law 
for AI is the question of legal personhood.     
Chopra and White offer a potential solution to the problem; treating the 
artificial agent as an instrument which has the legal power to enter into contracts, 
but is not in itself a legal person.95  Such an approach would call for principals—
in this case, automotive producers and the programmers they hire to design the 
“mind” of the HAV’s AI—to imbue their created agents with either the actual or 
apparent authority to enter into a “contract” with the owner/operators of the 
HAV.96  Chopra and White draw a rather useful analogy to Roman Law’s 
treatment of slaves to demonstrate their argument:  
 
“Like artificial agents, Roman slaves were skillful, and often 
engaged in commercial tasks on the direction of their masters. 
They were not recognized as legal persons by the ius civile, or civil 
law, and therefore lacked the power to sue in their own names. 
But, Roman slaves were enabled, by a variety of legal stipulations, 
to enter into contracts on behalf of their masters.  These could only 
be enforced through their masters, but, nevertheless, slaves had the 
capacity to bind a third party on their master's behalf. From this, 
[Ian R.] Kerr concludes that ‘[i]f . . . electronic commerce falls 
mainly in the hands of intelligent agent technology, the electronic 
slave metaphor could turn out to be more instructive than typical 
metaphors.”97 
 
Thus, by conceptualizing the AI as something akin to a slave in Roman Law— 
“an intelligent non-person actor with legal capacity to bind its principal”—and 
combining it with modern agency law’s apparent and actual authority provisions, 
a system of liability may be created for the seemingly independent and numerous 
actions that a HAV’s AI may need to take in completing the dynamic driving 
task.98  
																																								 																				
93 Supra, note 87 at 376.   
94 Id. at 377. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 378 (explaining the utility of Roman jurisprudence in understanding approaches to 
nonliving agents). 
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 Imposing such a system on the HAV AI carries with it a few distinct 
advantages.  First, holding the manufacturer liable for the acts of the HAV’s AI 
seems to be the most logical choice, as the manufacturer “creates” the agent. Also, 
from the perspective of agency law, the auto-manufacturer is the “least cost 
avoider,” and is therefore in the best position to prevent accidents through its 
programming of the HAV’s AI.  Corporate liability also insures that parties who 
are injured have the ability to recover the full cost of their injuries.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, corporate liability would incentivize manufacturers to 
ensure that the vehicle’s systems have minimized design flaws, as they would 
ultimately bear the cost of such flaws.  Despite concerns by scholars like Belay 
that imposing liability on auto-manufacturers would stifle innovation, Google, 
Mercedes-Benz—among a few others—have stated that they would willingly 
accept liability when their vehicle’s AI is found to be at fault for an accident, 
although, as recently demonstrated by Tesla’s press-releases regarding its 
Autopilot 2.0 system, such a bar may be difficult for the consumer to prove.99100    
 The imposition of corporate liability may create a “Moral Hazard 
Problem,” caused by owners and passengers in HAVs becoming more complacent 
about safe vehicle operation because they will not be responsible for any damage 
caused by the vehicle in the event of an accident.101  While corporations may be 
the “least cost avoiders,” individual drivers determine the level of accident risk 
when they engage the vehicle’s AI to drive, which may be in conditions that the 
system cannot handle.  By eliminating the drivers may choose to have their 
vehicles drive in situations where they personally would not, knowing that in the 
event of an accident, they will not be liable for damages.  These costs, borne by 
the auto-manufacturers, would slightly dampen the overall economic benefit of 
autonomous vehicles.  One potential way for auto-manufacturers to limit their 
own liability in these situations would be to prevent the vehicle from driving in 
potentially dangerous situations, i.e. if the vehicle’s AI decides that the driving 
conditions are dangerous, the vehicle will not drive.  In Level 3 and Level 4 
vehicles, the driver could still decide to take the risk of driving the vehicle in 
																																								 																				
99 Ryan Nakashima, Carmakers at Nevada Show: Driverless Cars Need Legal Framework, INS. J. 
(Jan. 13, 2014),  http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2014/01/13/316913.htm. 
100 HEISLER, supra, note 41 (voicing Tesla’s regulatory concerns).   
101 This problem, known as “moral hazard,” is a common argument brought against a variety of 
programs which limit liability for parties that may otherwise be responsible for unsafe or negligent 
behavior.  As a result, parties protected from the liability of their actions are more likely to engage 
in riskier behavior and/or take fewer precautions in order to mitigate their risk or loss.  Widely 
discussed in both economic and insurance circles, the argument of moral hazard has been applied 
to problems ranging from Federal Deposit Insurance requirements—which make consumers less 
concerned with a bank’s financial performance because their money will be protected by the 
federal government—to mandatory seat-belt laws, where drivers believe that their seatbelt will 
protect them in the event of an accident and will, in theory, drive more recklessly.  See generally, 
Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (W.W. Norton 
Company Ltd., 2008), at 30.  
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018  
The Modern Trolley Problem: Ethical and Economically-Sound Liability Schemes for 
Autonomous Vehicles 
________________________________________________________________________ 
21 
	
conditions, although this may require a separate level of individual insurance.  
This issue becomes amplified in Level 5 HAVs, because if the vehicle’s AI 
decides not to drive, the vehicle will not drive.102  For example, in the evacuation 
of a major city in the event of a large storm, the vehicle’s AI could decide that 
road conditions are too dangerous to evacuate a person, trapping them.  There 
may be a few potential work-arounds for this situation, such as an emergency 
override from the auto-manufacturers to allow travel or the use of the legal system 
to determine whether or not the driver was negligent in deciding to drive, akin to 
current tort cases.   
 Corporate liability through agency law does have issues that it must 
overcome before it is fully workable in the US legal system.  However, the 
distinct advantages it carries for both the consumer and the avoidance of major 
ethical problems mean that this system should become the dominant means of 
determining liability moving forward.  
 
IV. FOUR LIABILITY SCHEMES FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 
Having now examined each of the four components of our liability 
scheme—duty towards the individual or duty towards the society at large and 
individual liability or corporate liability—this note will now examine the four 
liability schemes that result from the individual combinations of each of the 
elements: duty towards the individual and individual liability; duty towards the 
society at large and corporate liability; duty towards the society at large and 
individual liability; and duty towards the individual and corporate liability.  In 
examining each of these four schemes, this note will examine both the economic 
costs--those by the owner/operators, the producers and programmers of HAVs, 
and society generally as well as any ethical issues that may arise from imposing 
such liability programs on the same parties. 
A. DUTY TOWARDS THE INDIVIDUAL AND INDIVIDUAL 
LIABILITY (THE CURRENT SYSTEM) 
 
The duty towards the individual and individual liability for accidents 
involving HAVs bears a striking resemblance to the current system.  The AI’s 
duty towards its owner and passengers is similar to the human driver’s instinct in 
self-preservation; that is to say that an AI which seeks to protect the lives of its 
passengers as its highest duty reflects an overwhelming majority of human 
driver’s own attitudes.  In addition, individual liability during the operation of a 
vehicle, even one with significant assistance from computer systems such as 
autopilot in commercial airliners, has routinely been imposed by courts in 
jurisdictions around the United States.103   
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Protecting the lives of its passengers despite the cost it may have on 
society as a whole should ease the transition from Level 2 autonomous vehicles 
where the driver controls the majority of the driving task to Level 3 HAVs and 
beyond by creating peace of mind for drivers, who know that their vehicle’s AI 
will do everything within its power to protect their lives.  As mentioned earlier, a 
majority of drivers would prefer that their vehicle’s AI would protect them or 
their loved ones instead of others outside of the vehicle in the event of an 
accident.104  If the goal governments and auto-manufacturers is to replace all 
Level 0, 1, and 2 vehicles on the road with Level 5 vehicles in the long term, then 
consumers must be comfortable with the short term solutions of Level 3 and 4 
vehicles; one way to create that comfort would be for auto-manufacturers to 
design or install their HAV’s AI with a prerogative to protect the lives of its 
passengers at all costs.   
Individual liability for the HAV’s actions is appropriate when a human 
operator is responsible for the safe operation of the vehicle in difficult situations 
which the AI is unable to handle on its own. These early, Level 3 HAVs require 
its operators remain attentive and able to take control in the event that the AI 
encounters a situation—inclement weather, sensor failure, impending accident, 
etc.—which it is unable to handle.105  These warning systems are designed to give 
the operator adequate time to take notice of the situation and react appropriately, 
giving all or almost all control of the dynamic driving task back to the driver.  
Level 3 HAVs function like autopilot on modern commercial airlines; the pilot 
taxis, takes-off, and lands, but the autopilot flies the aircraft once engaged by the 
pilot at a certain altitude.  In the event of a situation in which the autopilot is 
unable to control the aircraft, the pilot is required to take physical control and 
guide the aircraft until the situation which the autopilot could not handle is abated 
or the aircraft has landed.106   
However, if the pilot fails to take control of an aircraft when the autopilot 
can no longer safely operate, then he or she can be held liable for their failure to 
action.  In Brouse v. United States, the pilot of an aircraft was held liable for the 
damages caused when his aircraft crashed into another while the autopilot was 
engaged.  The US District court held that the operator of an aircraft has “[an] 
obligation of those in charge of a plane under robot control to keep a proper and 
constant lookout” in order to safely operate the aircraft.107  Additionally, the court 
found that, “had a proper lookout been maintained the collision would not have 
occurred.” 108  Individual liability, as understood through Brouse, would require 
that operators of HAVs be on the lookout for any potential hazards while their 
vehicle is on the road, and to avoid the accidents themselves when the situation 
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requires.  However, if an accident occurs and it is deemed to be because of the 
operator’s own negligence, they would not be able to rely on the fact that their 
HAV was in autopilot mode in order to avoid liability.109 
While the autopilot analogy and individual protection with individual 
liability may succeed in the short term, especially with transitioning consumers 
into the market, this liability scheme will ultimately be phased out in favor of 
some of the other systems discussed below.  First, individual liability will be a 
difficult sell long term with Level 4 and especially Level 5 HAVs.  Individual 
liability for Level 4 HAVs could be a difficult sell considering that operators are 
not required to intervene in the event of an imminent collision.110  A possible 
scenario of individual liability would probably be utilized by auto-manufacturers 
or their insurance companies in a subrogation action to recover against a driver 
who negligently overrode the HAV’s AI to control the vehicle in the event of an 
accident.  For example, if a Level 4 HAV indicated to its driver that the vehicle 
was to be involved in an accident, and the driver then took control of the vehicle 
instead of letting the AI direct the crash only to cause substantially more damage 
than would have occurred, a potential right of action by the insurer could be 
theorized to recover for the difference in damages caused by the behavior of the 
operator.  However, because Level 5 HAVs completely lack any means for its 
passengers to control the dynamic driving task, individual liability borders on the 
absurd; it would be the equivalent of holding the passengers of an aircraft liable 
for the pilot’s decisions in an accident.  Therefore, as autonomous vehicles 
continue to rely less and less on their occupants for assistance in the dynamic 
driving task, a system of individual liability, at least for vehicles with human 
occupants, should eventually disappear entirely.   
B. DUTY TOWARDS SOCIETY AT LARGE AND CORPORATE 
LIABILITY (THE CORPORATION’S AGENT) 
 
Under this liability scheme, the HAV’s AI would be designed to reduce 
the costs of its accidents and those who designed the AI would bear the costs of 
the accident.  This system would be the purest incarnation of agency law applied 
to autonomous vehicles; HAV AI would be designed to serve the best interests of 
its producers by limiting its liability in the event of an accident by pursuing the 
lowest cost outcome.  Combining the exact opposite set of values and liabilities 
creates a completely different set of costs and benefits for this system, both 
economically and morally.  While the system would be a difficult for individual 
consumers to accept for their own personal vehicles, this system could be 
attractive to large corporate clients and shipping companies to reduce the costs 
and potential loses for the transportation of everyday goods.   
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HAV AI designed to minimize the cost of accidents is an attractive 
alternative to a duty to unilaterally protect its passengers when there are no human 
passengers to protect, such as cargo shipments across the US.  Fully autonomous 
vehicles would completely eliminate the need for commercial truck drivers, who 
serve no other purpose than to guide the vehicles and their cargo from point A to 
point B.  Therefore, the duty for the HAV’s AI to protect its passengers is 
rendered moot.  In the event that a HAV cargo transportation vehicle is involved 
in an accident, the HAV’s AI would seek to limit the damage caused by the 
accident.  Accidents involving a cargo transportation HAV and non-human 
entities—such as an imminent collision with non-human objects—would seek to 
limit the cost based on the AI’s analysis of cost based on its programming, while 
accidents involving a cargo transportation HAV and humans would presumably 
seek to limit the injury to human parties.111  This system could reduce the overall 
costs for shipping companies around the US, who routinely spend 75% of the 
shipping cost per vehicle on labor.  Additionally, the introduction of HAV 
shipping would further reduce shipping costs by allowing vehicles to travel for a 
longer duration without stopping for rest; currently, truck drivers are “restricted 
by law from driving more than 11 hours per day without taking an 8-hour break,” 
while a HAV would be able to travel for twenty-four hours continuously.112  
These benefits, however, are not without their costs, namely the replacement of 
nearly 1.6 million truck drivers in the United States.113  However, the savings for 
shipping companies, in terms of labor, cost of upgrading the fleet to HAVs, and 
efficiency gains, would greatly reduce the cost of shipping via trucks, potentially 
passing on such gains to the consumer.    
In addition, this liability scheme may be attractive to those who are willing 
to accept a, relatively speaking, higher level of risk which lowers or eliminates 
their costs for personal insurance.  The best current analogy to such a system is 
found in health insurance, with high-deductible/ low premium plans.  These plans 
offer much lower monthly premiums combined with much  higher out-of-pocket 
costs in the event of an accident.114  These plans are most attractive to those who 
have few or no health problems which require consistent management, but do not 
have the means to—or do not wish to spend their income on more—lower 
deductible, higher premium plans, such as young, healthy adults who have 
																																								 																				
111 As discussed previously in the section about “Duty towards Society,” Utilitarianism may 
sometimes lead to an issue where human life, based on certain evaluation criterion, could be 
considered less valuable than certain objects.  Supra, note 65.   
112 Ryan Petersen, The Driverless Truck is Coming, and it’s Going to Automate Millions of Jobs, 
TECH CRUNCH  (Apr. 25, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/25/the-driverless-truck-is-
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113 Id. see also, Todd Litman, Autonomous Vehicle Implementation Predictions” VICTORIA 
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recently entered the workforce.115  In the context of HAVs, such a system would 
be attractive to those who fall into a “low-risk” pool, such as those who do not 
drive often and/or those who drive in lower accident prone areas or during lower 
traffic hours.116  Millennials would be an ideal consumer under this liability 
scheme; Millennials among other qualities, have a lower rate of car ownership 
than other generations, live in urban environments where vehicle use is rare,  and 
have lower levels of income which they may be unwilling to spend on car 
insurance, etc.117    
Corporate Liability via agency law in the context of programming the 
HAV’s AI to limit the overall cost of an accident is a viable solution, as the 
automobile corporation is the “least cost avoider.”  Under the concept of agency 
law, the principal is generally held liable for the actions of their agents in the 
event of an accident because they are best able to avoid the costs of the accident 
as opposed to either of the involved parties (namely the agent or the injured third 
party).118  The auto manufacturer is the least-cost avoider, and therefore the 
rightful bearer of liability, because they ultimately design the HAV AI and how it 
will interact with the outside world.  Thus, holding the auto-manufacturer liable is 
appropriate when the vehicle is designed to create the least economic damage 
possible.   
Although the courts have previously taken a products liability approach in 
holding auto manufacturers liable for accidents involving vehicles internal 
systems, such as cruise control, these cases provide an example of how the courts 
may consider individual cases for holding auto manufacturers liable for accidents.  
In Cole v. Ford Motor Company, the court allowed for a products liability action 
to proceed against the Ford Motor Company for a defectively designed cruise-
control setting.119  The plaintiff drove his vehicle with the cruise control engaged, 
and had turned off the vehicle without turning off the cruise control.120  When the 
plaintiff drove the vehicle again, he did not turn on the cruise control, but when 
the plaintiff attempted to stop the vehicle, the vehicle suddenly sped up, causing 
the plaintiff to crash into a guard-rail and injure himself.121  The Oregon Court of 
Appeals upheld a decision by the trial court that the defective design of the cruise 
control was the cause of the accident; even though the driver did not personally 
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engage the cruise control, there was sufficient evidence to show that the cruise 
control engaged itself and caused the accident.122   
Treating the HAV’s AI as an artificial agent and holding auto-
manufacturers for designs or defects which result in accidents while also ensuring 
that accidents cause the least damage possible allow society to reap the most 
economic benefit from the transition to autonomous vehicles.  The millions saved 
from accident cost avoidance and the ability to hold the “least cost avoider” liable 
for accidents will allow for efficient allocation of resources and incentivize auto-
manufacturers to design HAV AI which seeks to avoid accidents.  
 
C. DUTY TOWARDS THE SOCIETY AT LARGE AND INDIVIDUAL 
LIABILITY (THE ANALYTIC A POSTERIORI)  
 
Unlike the previous two liability schemes, this one seems rather difficult 
to mesh together in a way that resembles any current scheme under the law or one 
that may perceivably exist in the future.  The system would, in essence, ask 
operators and passengers of vehicles to accept personal liability for the driving 
decisions of the HAV’s AI while also risking that, in the event of an accident, the 
vehicle would seek to minimize the total damage caused without concern for 
passengers inside the vehicle.  Such a system would create obvious disincentives 
for those inside the vehicle; it is difficult to expect one to pay for the damages of 
an accident that they themselves did not cause while inside a vehicle that would 
so willingly sacrifice their safety and well-being if the HAV’s AI determines that 
the cost of their lives is less than the potential cost of attempting to save those 
lives.   As a result, such a liability system would, at best, only be limited to 
commercial shipping, where there would no risk of harming the driver, and could 
be used in situations where auto-manufacturers would be unwilling to accept 
liability for potential accidents where costs would be extremely high, as is the 
case with accidents involving the transportation of toxic waste or other similarly 
environmentally hazardous products.   
Auto-manufacturers would likely be unwilling to accept liability for 
vehicles involved in accidents where the cost of such accidents would be 
exceedingly high, as is the case with toxic or radioactive materials.  Despite safety 
precautions taken by the transportation industry to reduce the likelihood that the 
materials will spill out in the event of an accident, if the material does manage to 
spill out onto the roadway, the costs can be extremely high.  Since auto-
manufacturers would likely seek to avoid such costs, and are under no legal 
obligation to provide their services to such customers, they would have the ability 
to require that certain classes of commercial transportation retain the liability for 
accidents involving the vehicle.   
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D. DUTY TOWARDS THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE 
LIABILITY (THE FIDUCIARY AGENT) 
 
The final liability scheme contemplated by this note would require HAV 
AI to be designed to keep its human occupants safe at all costs while the auto 
manufacturers would retain liability for all accidents caused by the AI.  Similar to 
the fiduciary duties owed in the agent-principal relationship, this system would, in 
essence, treat the HAV’s AI as the agent of the auto-manufacturer “hired” by the 
purchaser of the vehicle to protect the physical well-being of its occupants in the 
event of an accident at all costs.  As a result, owners would expect, and vehicles 
would be designed to, take any and all steps in order to protect the lives of its 
passengers.  Despite the seemingly high cost of such a liability scheme on auto-
manufacturers, this system will ultimately lead to lower costs for both the 
corporations and to society at large by incentivizing driver adoption of the new 
technology and prudent AI development.    
Generally speaking, the agent typically owes a fiduciary duty to their 
principal.  The fiduciary principle consists of two separate and legally distinct 
duties, the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.  The duty of care requires that the 
fiduciary “[act] as a prudent person does in the management of his own affairs of 
equal gravity,” while the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to “maximize the 
investors’ wealth rather than [their] own.”123  When one party acts as a fiduciary 
to another, like an agent and principal, one party acts in accordance with the best 
interests of the other party, even at the expense of their own interests.124  In the 
event that the fiduciary does not act in the best interests of the other party, the 
other party has the ability to sue their fiduciary for violating that duty, which 
sometimes carries harsh financial penalties for the breaching party. According to 
Frank Easterbrook, the fiduciary duty is used in place of a traditional contract to 
assign duties when uncertainty of future circumstances requires greater flexibility 
than a contract would otherwise allow.125 There is a “divergence of interests” of 
the two parties, and replacing “prior supervision with deterrence” of unfaithful 
acts lowers the cost of compliance.126   
For many of the reasons described by Easterbrook, the concept of 
fiduciary duty would work well in the context of autonomous vehicles.  First, it 
would be difficult, if not nearly impossible, to create a contract between the HAV 
AI and the operator or occupants of the vehicle that could account for all driving 
decisions the AI will need to make.  Just as management of a corporation requires 
flexibility from its managers to respond to changes in the market to make 
“optimal investment and management decisions,” autonomous driving requires 
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the HAV’s AI to make many decisions involving the safety of its occupants 
whenever it is engaged.127  Secondly—and perhaps the most compelling reason to 
implement a fiduciary duty—fiduciary duties are used to protect against the 
divergent interests of the two parties involved.  The auto manufacturer would 
want the HAV’s AI to limit the financial cost of any accident, while any 
passenger in the autonomous vehicle wants to avoid as much personal injury as 
possible; a defined fiduciary duty towards the occupants of the vehicle would 
likely eliminate this conflict of interest.  Finally, the fiduciary duty of the HAV’s 
AI to its passengers will create peace of mind as occupants will know that the 
vehicle is designed to put their well-being first.  Just as shareholders of a 
corporation do not have to constantly monitor every decision that the board of 
directors makes because the fiduciary duty either protects their interests or 
provides them with recourse, owners and passengers of autonomous vehicles 
would know that all the driving decisions made by the HAV’s AI are performed 
to protect their safety above all else.128      
Practically speaking, treating the HAV’s AI as a fiduciary of the driver is 
most similar to the “common-carrier” duty in tort law, which requires that the 
driver of a common carrier vehicle, “one who holds himself out to the public as 
engaged in business of transportation of persons or property from place to place 
for compensation, and who offers services to the public generally,” to protect the 
life and safety of its passengers as the highest duty.129  These “common carriers” 
may either be individual drivers who operate a service or a driver under the 
employ of a corporation who own multiple vehicles which they allow their 
employees to drive in order to transport passengers.130  Additionally, the common 
carrier  status is often defined through legislation which is designed to protect 
passengers from harm by through the legislatures imposition of this duty.131  In 
litigation, passengers of common carriers who are injured while riding with a 
common carrier are entitled to recovery from that carrier, even if an employee or 
agent of that company causes the injury.132 As a result of these similarities, at least 
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in terms of how courts have traditionally handled the injured parties, common 
carrier cases provide an example of how this liability scheme would seek to give 
the fiduciary duty to passengers of HAVs and how damages may work in the 
event of an accident.   
The question now becomes how the fiduciary duty as traditionally 
understood transfer from the auto-manufacturer to the purchaser of the HAV.  
Under modern agency law, the HAV AI would be considered the agent of the 
auto-manufacturer, performing a service on behalf of the auto-manufacturer for 
the occupants.  While the HAV’s AI would owe some duty of care towards its 
occupants, its fiduciary duty would be towards the auto-manufacturer, meaning 
that it would seek to limit the financial costs of the accident.  This approach has 
already been discussed as a liability scheme in Section IV:B.  One possible 
solution to this issue would be to take the common carrier approach and legislate 
the duty towards the passengers.  The other solution is offered by Chopra and 
White in combining modern agency law and concepts of Roman Slavery.133  
Under this approach, when the vehicle is purchased, the owner also purchases the 
service of the HAV’s AI, who now becomes the agent’s the new principal.  
However, since the “agent” lacks any resources of its own—much like slaves in 
Roman society—their creators, the auto-manufacturers, would be required to step 
in to cover any damages the HAV AI causes to the occupants.   
Through protecting the lives of the human occupants at all costs and 
replacing individual liability for accidents with manufacturer liability, this 
liability scheme has the most potential to convince almost all drivers to transition 
to autonomous vehicles.  As mentioned in previous sections, individuals would 
much rather have their HAV’s AI protect them and their passengers over the lives 
of those outside the vehicle.134  In addition, this liability scheme eliminates the 
major ethical and economical issue involved with holding individuals responsible 
for the decisions of the HAV’s AI when the vehicles become fully autonomous.  
Furthermore, requiring the HAV AI to protect its individual occupants and auto-
manufacturer liability will likely decrease the overall costs of accidents to both 
the individual occupants and to society as a whole because auto-manufacturers 
will be liable for any damages.  As a result, auto-manufacturers will be 
incentivized to design HAV AI and vehicles that respond to accident situations in 
the most optimal manner, one of the goals of transitioning away from human 
drivers in favor of AI.  Purchasers of autonomous vehicles may be willing to pay 
a premium if this liability system exists as an alternative to the overall cost-
limiting, manufacturer liability contemplated in Section IV:B.  If that system 
appeals to people who do not use their vehicles often—urban dwellers or 
Millennials, for example—then perhaps this system would appeal to consumers 
who spend a significant portion of their time in their vehicles or are more invested 
																																								 																				
133 Chopra, supra note 87.  
134 Supra note 64. 
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in personal safety, such as stay-at-home parents or individuals with families.  
Finally, if consumers believe that the vehicles are optimally designed to avoid 
accidents and will seek to protect them in the unlikely event that an accident 
should occur, consumer trust in autonomous vehicle technology will allow the 
technology to almost fully replace all human drivers on the road.   
The costs to the auto-manufacturer is perhaps the largest hurdle to 
implementation of this liability scheme.  Accidents where the HAV’s AI is 
required to take all steps necessary will likely cost auto-manufacturers thousands 
of dollars in property and other damages, such as those caused to other drivers.135  
Additionally, an auto-manufacturer may face a risk of litigation from injured 
passengers or the estates of passengers killed in accidents, who believe that the AI 
violated its fiduciary duty towards them.  Finally, costs from designing HAV AI 
sufficient to meet the needs of consumers could also be high.  These concerns 
appear, on the surface, to doom this liability system from inception; the financial 
costs would overburden already struggling auto-manufacturers with costs that 
they are, for the most part, already able to avoid.  However, it should first be 
noted that the implementation of such a system is a long way off; most experts 
and industry insiders believe that autonomous vehicles will only enter the 
roadway in the next ten to fifteen years.136  In addition, these early vehicles will 
likely only be Level 3 or 4 vehicles, meaning that a system of individual 
insurance could persist as drivers will need to take over for the HAV’s AI in 
certain situations.137  Early estimates put claim that Level 5 HAVs will only 
become the dominant means of transportation on the roadway by 2040.138   
This time between initial implementation of autonomous vehicles and 
Level 5 HAVs is crucial for a few reasons.  First, the initial test run of Level 3 and 
4 HAVs will allow auto-manufacturers to continually test out AI in real world 
driving situations, similar to the beta-testing being performed by Google, Tesla, 
and other auto-manufacturers.  The information from the initial implementation 
will be far more valuable from the current beta-testing occurring now because 
there will be millions of drivers in vehicles providing data back to the auto-
manufacturers, and the testing will also detail how autonomous vehicles interact 
with one another.  These results may allow for improved AI design in future 
																																								 																				
135 The NHTSA estimates that the overall economic costs of accidents in 2010 was roughly $242 
billion.  If other crash statistics by the NHTSA are correct and only 4% of accidents were caused 
by non-human errors, auto-manufacturers as an industry would have been responsible under this 
liability scheme with autonomous vehicles for $9.68 billion, an amount which would likely 
seriously damage the industry as a whole.  Nat. Highway Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, (2010), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013. 
136A collection of articles and expert opinions puts the initial implementation of autonomous 
vehicles around the year 2020.  ͞Driverless Future, Forecasts, http://www.driverless-
future.com/?page_id=384 (Last Accessed Nov. 27, 2016) 
137 Id.; see also SAE Int'l, supra note 11.   
138 SAE Int'l, supra note 11. 
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autonomous vehicle models, which would be better designed to eliminate 
accidents.  Additionally, the continued use—at least for some time in the near 
future—of individual liability for accidents would delay the inevitable shift 
towards manufacturer liability.  This would allow auto-manufacturers to study 
accidents and implement technological changes that either reduce the costs of that 
type of accident or eliminate it altogether.   
Designing the HAV’s AI to protect its occupants while holding auto-
manufacturers liable appears to be the most economical, ethical, and logical 
approach to fully implementing autonomous vehicles onto the roadway in the 
future.  Through a fiduciary duty owed by the HAVs AI to the occupants of the 
vehicle, consumers would know that the vehicle would seek to protect them in the 
event of an accident, while holding the auto-manufacturer liable would eliminate 
the ethical issue of holding the occupants responsible for acts over which they 
have no control.  Although this system appears to have high financial costs, many 
of these costs would be eliminated or reduced in the future as autonomous vehicle 
technology improves and future sales would likely defray all expenses from 
accidents.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In exploring the issue of potential liability systems that may be imposed 
on HAVs as they are introduced onto the roadways, it is clear that the options 
presented have varying degrees of usefulness and fairness.  As time moves on and 
the technology and societal views towards HAVs advance, liability schemes will 
inevitably fall out of usefulness, and ones that could not have been applied when 
the vehicles first appeared on the road will become the dominant systems.   
First, for many of the reasons outlined in Section IV;C, the concept of 
having a vehicle aim to minimize damage at the expense of the driver and 
individual liability is a fairly unattractive option to begin with except perhaps in 
commercial circumstances.  Individual liability would be a difficult sell for most 
potential purchasers of HAVs in general, and combining individual liability with 
the idea that the vehicle will injure or kill the driver if the internal AI determines 
that such a course will result in an overall lower cost is likely to make such a 
liability scheme untenable for individual drivers.  However, there is a possibility 
that auto-manufacturers could use this system to allow for the transportation of 
materials which they believe that, in the event of an accident, would severely 
damage their bottom line and, therefore, do not wish to be liable for.   
Creating HAVs which have a duty towards the individual and individual 
liability most clearly models the current system of automotive liability by 
mirroring both the incentives of human drivers and the intendant risks involved 
with them.  This system would probably see the most use during the initial 
introduction of HAVs, and especially Level 3 vehicles, where the driver would be 
required to take control of the dynamic driving task in emergency instances when 
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the vehicle is unable to drive properly or avoid an accident by itself.  However, it 
is clear that this system will become obsolete as Level 4 and 5 vehicles come to 
dominate the road, as individual liability will become unattractive to the majority 
of drivers.   
The last two liability schemes contemplated in this note, appear equally 
appealing as possible solutions to the issue of HAV liability, depending on 
various factors.  A system in which the HAV’s duty is to protect the interests of 
the society at large while the corporation is liable for accidents would be 
attractive to many individuals for a variety of reasons.  First, in areas where the 
risk of serious injury is relatively low and accidents are less serious—urban 
environments with stop-and-go traffic or commercial shipping, for example—
would be ideal implementations of this liability scheme.  Especially if certain 
classes of occupant are willing to accept a slightly higher level of risk for a lower 
overall cost, this system could succeed in personal use.  More likely, the 
commercial shipping industry, the only “occupants” in the vehicle are cargo and 
therefore expendable compared to human lives that may be inside other vehicles, 
will utilize this system.  Additionally, parties who ship their goods using 
commercial carriers would likely appreciate the lower costs associated with an 
overall lower cost of accidents.   
Finally, a liability scheme which protects the individual drivers and holds 
the auto-manufacturer liable for accidents will most likely be how automobile 
insurance is handled in the future.  It not only mirrors the choices that human 
drivers would make when placed in a similar situation, it also eliminates the issue 
of holding someone individually liable for the actions of a vehicle over which 
they had no control.  As a result, individuals would be more willing to adopt this 
new technology, as it would be seen to have their best interests, allowing society 
as a whole to achieve its two goals of autonomous vehicle technology: full 
adoption by consumers and overall reduced costs from automobile accidents.  
While this system appears to have high costs for auto-manufacturers using current 
numbers, it should be noted that this system of liability is still a long way off, and 
auto-manufacturers can use that time to decrease costs of accidents and 
development to significantly lower levels in the future.   
 Autonomous vehicle technology will soon come to dominate the roadway, 
here in the United States and around the world.  Preparing for the inevitable now, 
and understanding how to best protect individual consumers from harm in the 
event of an accident, will allow for the smooth and complete transition from 
human to AI drivers. 
  
